期刊论文详细信息
| International Journal Of The Commons | |
| Community-level natural resource management institutions: A noncooperative equilibrium example | |
| Kim Kaivanto1  | |
| [1] Lancaster University | |
| 关键词: community-level natural resource management institutions; inshore artisanal fisheries; governing the commons; noncooperative game theory; correlated equilibrium; | |
| DOI : 10.18352/ijc.847 | |
| 学科分类:环境科学(综合) | |
| 来源: The International Association For The Study Of The Commons | |
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【 摘 要 】
The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) literature finds that Nash equilibrium predictions are empirically falsified in the social dilemmas that arise in community-level natural resource management problems. However, Nash equilibrium is
【 授权许可】
CC BY-NC
【 预 览 】
| Files | Size | Format | View |
|---|---|---|---|
| RO201909027172260ZK.pdf | 330KB |
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