Biosecurity and Dual-Use Research: Gaining Function – But at What Cost?

Frontiers in Public Health

Kathleen M. Vogel¹ 

关键词: biosecurity;    dual-use research;    influenza;    editorial;    bioterrorism;   

DOI  :  10.3389/fpubh.2015.00013

学科分类：卫生学

来源: Frontiers

【 摘 要 】

In September 2011, scientists announced new experimental findings that would not only threaten the conduct and publication of influenza research, but would have significant policy and intelligence implications. The findings presented a modified variant of the H5N1 avian influenza virus (hereafter referred to as the H5N1 virus) that was transmissible via aerosol between ferrets (1, 2). These results suggested a worrisome possibility: the existence of a new airborne and highly lethal H5N1 virus that could cause a deadly global pandemic. In response, a series of international discussions on the nature of dual-use life science arose (3). More proposed “gain-of-function (GOF)” research on the flu, and other respiratory viruses such as severe acquired respiratory syndrome (SARS) and middle east coronavirus (MERS-CoV), has led to this work being labeled as having “potential pandemic potential (PPP).”.

【 授权许可】

CC BY