Frontiers in Psychology | |
Sameness and the self: philosophical and psychological considerations | |
Stanley B. Klein1  | |
关键词: identity of self; memory; personal diachronicity; self; temporal continuity; | |
DOI : 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00029 | |
学科分类:心理学(综合) | |
来源: Frontiers | |
【 摘 要 】
In this paper I examine the concept of cross-temporal personal identity (diachronicity). This particular form of identity has vexed theorists for centuries—e.g., how can a person maintain a belief in the sameness of self over time in the face of continual psychological and physical change? I first discuss various forms of the sameness relation and the criteria that justify their application. I then examine philosophical and psychological treatments of personal diachronicity (for example, Locke's psychological connectedness theory; the role of episodic memory) and find each lacking on logical grounds, empirical grounds or both. I conclude that to achieve a successful resolution of the issue of the self as a temporal continuant we need to draw a sharp distinction between the feeling of the sameness of one's self and the evidence marshaled in support of that feeling.
【 授权许可】
CC BY
【 预 览 】
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RO201904028170824ZK.pdf | 601KB | download |