Why are dreams interesting for philosophers? The example of minimal phenomenal selfhood, plus an agenda for future research

Frontiers in Psychology

Thomas Metzinger¹ 

关键词: consciousness;    self-consciousness;    minimal phenomenal selfhood;    full-body illusions;    out-of-body experiences;    bodiless dreams;    first-person perspective;    mind wandering;   

DOI  :  10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00746

学科分类：心理学（综合）

来源: Frontiers

【 摘 要 】

This metatheoretical paper develops a list of new research targets by exploring particularly promising interdisciplinary contact points between empirical dream research and philosophy of mind. The central example is the MPS-problem. It is constituted by the epistemic goal of conceptually isolating and empirically grounding the phenomenal property of “minimal phenomenal selfhood,” which refers to the simplest form of self-consciousness. In order to precisely describe MPS, one must focus on those conditions that are not only causally enabling, but strictly necessary to bring it into existence. This contribution argues that research on bodiless dreams, asomatic out-of-body experiences, and full-body illusions has the potential to make decisive future contributions. Further items on the proposed list of novel research targets include differentiating the concept of a “first-person perspective” on the subcognitive level; investigating relevant phenomenological and neurofunctional commonalities between mind-wandering and dreaming; comparing the functional depth of embodiment across dream and wake states; and demonstrating that the conceptual consequences of cognitive corruption and systematic rationality deficits in the dream state are much more serious for philosophical epistemology (and, perhaps, the methodology of dream research itself) than commonly assumed. The paper closes by specifying a list of potentially innovative research goals that could serve to establish a stronger connection between dream research and philosophy of mind.

【 授权许可】

CC BY