General and specific consciousness: a first-order representationalist approach

Frontiers in Psychology

Neil Mehta¹ 

关键词: consciousness;    neural correlate;    level of consciousness;    content of consciousness;    representationalism;    first-order representationalism;   

DOI  :  10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00407

学科分类：心理学（综合）

来源: Frontiers

【 摘 要 】

It is widely acknowledged that a complete theory of consciousness should explain general consciousness (what makes a state conscious at all) and specific consciousness (what gives a conscious state its particular phenomenal quality). We defend first-order representationalism, which argues that consciousness consists of sensory representations directly available to the subject for action selection, belief formation, planning, etc. We provide a neuroscientific framework for this primarily philosophical theory, according to which neural correlates of general consciousness include prefrontal cortex, posterior parietal cortex, and non-specific thalamic nuclei, while neural correlates of specific consciousness include sensory cortex and specific thalamic nuclei. We suggest that recent data support first-order representationalism over biological theory, higher-order representationalism, recurrent processing theory, information integration theory, and global workspace theory.

【 授权许可】

CC BY