Mentalization, attachment, and subjective identity

Frontiers in Psychology

Rossella Guerini¹ 

关键词: attachment;    borderline personality disorder;    introspection;    mindreading;    subjective identity;   

DOI  :  10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01022

学科分类：心理学（综合）

来源: Frontiers

【 摘 要 】

In a life-span perspective, Baglio and Marchetti make the hypothesis of “the existence of multiple kinds of Theory of Mind” and urge the transition from a discrete to a dimensional approach in the study of mentalization (“ToM may vary along a quantitative and a qualitative continuum”). We resist such a plea and argue that we can stick to a discrete approach which posits just a single early-developing mindreading system, and then works out a “third-person first” perspective on mentalization, according to which the understanding of other minds both ontogenetically precedes and grounds the understanding of our own minds. In this third-person first framework, Baglio and Marchetti's claim that mentalization is “a multifaceted set of competences liable to influence—and be influenced by—a manifold of psychosocial aspects” is reformulated as follows: first-person mentalization evolves in an interplay of third-person mentalization, autobiographical memory and socio-communicative skills attuned by cultural variables. Let us examine these points one by one.

【 授权许可】

CC BY