Commentary: From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0

Frontiers in Psychology

Marek Pokropski¹ 

关键词: consciousness;    mechanism;    phenomenology;    naturalism;    phenomenology of consciousness;   

DOI  :  10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00101

学科分类：心理学（综合）

来源: Frontiers

【 摘 要 】

Mechanistic explanations are applied widely in life sciences (e.g., Craver and Derden, 2013). Interestingly, in recent years there have been attempts at applying the mechanistic approach to cognitive sciences (e.g., Craver, 2007; Bechtel, 2008; Miłkowski, 2016) including an attempt to mechanistically explain consciousness. Masafumi Oizumi, Larissa Albantakis and Giulio Tononi proposed an interesting mechanistic explanation of consciousness in their paper (Oizumi et al., 2014), which is a third version of Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness, previously formulated by Tononi (2004) and Balduzzi and Tononi (2009). The main hypothesis of IIT is that “consciousness has to do with the capacity to integrate information” (2004, p. 2).

【 授权许可】

CC BY