Commentary: Getting into predictive processing's great guessing game: Bootstrap heaven or hell?

Frontiers in Psychology

Michał Piekarski¹ 

关键词: content;    representation;    predictive processing theory of cognition;    prediction;    action;    decision making;   

DOI  :  10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01244

学科分类：心理学（综合）

来源: Frontiers

【 摘 要 】

Hutto and Myin (2013) put forward a thesis that the so-called basic minds do not have any content. From their point of view, this means that basic minds are not representational. There is no value that can be ascribed to concepts such as “content” and “representation” when it comes to explaining perception and mental processes. Hutto and Myin believe that content is something which is superimposed upon mental processes by means of language and culture. They claim that most contemporary positions in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science assume Content Involving Account of Cognition (CIC). Radical Enactive, Embodied Account of Cognition (REC) rejects the belief in the constitutive role of content in cognition. The radicalism of their approach stems from the failure to solve the Hard Problem of Content (HPC), which undermines the possibility of offering a naturalistic justification of the relation between contentful properties and physical properties (Hutto and Myin, 2013, p. 69).

【 授权许可】

CC BY