Improved Timing Attacks against the Secret Permutation in the McEliece PKC

International journal of computers, communications and control

Dominic Bucerzan¹  Pierre-Louis Cayrel²  Tania Richmond³  Vlad Dragoi⁴ 

[1]Aurel Vlaicu University of AradDepartment of Mathematics and ComputerScienceRomania, 310330 Arad, Elena Dragoi, 2Corresponding

[2]Laboratoire Hubert Curien, UMR CNRS 5516,Université de Lyon, Saint-Etienne, France

[3]Laboratoire IMATH, EA 2134,Avenue de l’Université , BP 20132,83957 La Garde Cedex, France

[4]Laboratoire LITIS - EA 4108Université de Rouen - UFR Sciences etTechniques,76800 Saint Etienne du Rouvray, France

关键词: communication systems;    theory of error correcting codes;    code-based cryptography;    McEliece PKC;    side-channel attacks;    timing attack;    extended Euclidean algorithm;   

DOI  :  10.15837/ijccc.2017.1.2780

学科分类：计算机科学（综合）

来源: Universitatea Agora

【 摘 要 】

In this paper, we detail two side-channel attacks against the McEliece public-key cryptosystem. They are exploiting timing differences on the Patterson decoding algorithm in order to reveal one part of the secret key: the support permutation. The first one is improving two existing timing attacks and uses the correlation between two different steps of the decoding algorithm. This improvement can be deployed on all error-vectors with Hamming weight smaller than a quarter of the minimum distance of the code. The second attack targets the evaluation of the error locator polynomial and succeeds on several different decoding algorithms. We also give an appropriate countermeasure.

【 授权许可】

Free