Eavesdropping near-field contactless payments: a quantitative analysis

The Journal of Engineering

Tim W. C. Brown¹  Johann A. Briffa²  Thomas P. Diakos²  Stephan Wesemeyer² 

[1] Center for Communication Systems Research, University of Surrey, Guildford, GU2 7XH, UK;Department of Computing, University of Surrey, Guildford GU2 7XH, UK

关键词: near-field communication inductive loop antenna;    ISO 14443 st;    ard;    official maximum operating distance;    eavesdropping attack;    shopping trolley;    ISO 14443 transmission;    magnetic field strength;    inductive loop antenna;    bit error rates;    contactless payment transaction;    near-field contactless payment eavesdropping;    quantitative analysis;    data frame recovery;    low-cost electronics;    frame error rates;    concealable antenna;   

DOI  :  10.1049/joe.2013.0087

学科分类：工程和技术（综合）

来源: IET

【 摘 要 】

This paper presents an assessment of how successful an eavesdropping attack on a contactless payment transaction can be in terms of bit and frame error rates, using an easily concealable antenna and low-cost electronics. Potential success of an eavesdropping attack largely depends on the correct recovery of the data frames used in the ISO 14443 standard. A near-field communication inductive loop antenna was used to emulate an ISO 14443 transmission. For eavesdropping, an identical inductive loop antenna as well as a shopping trolley modified to act like an antenna were used. The authors present and analyse frame error rates obtained with the authors equipment over a range of distances, up to 100 cm, well above the official maximum operating distance depending on the magnetic field strength.

【 授权许可】

CC BY