Dynamic Incentives in Microfinance Group Lending: An Empirical Analysis of Progressive Lending Mechanism

SAGE Open

Naveen Kumar K¹ 

关键词: asymmetries of information;    dynamic incentives;    group lending;    self-help group;    microfinance;   

DOI  :  10.1177/2158244012444280

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: Sage Journals

【 摘 要 】

One of the most essential tools of poverty reduction would be the viable expansion of institutional credit facilities to large sections of the people who neither have adequate collateral nor credit history to secure a loan. In this backdrop, social collateral is popularized through the group lending programs to address the credit market problems. Microfinance through group lending is acting as a screening device; the joint liability mechanism creates incentives for internal monitoring. Hence, it has received a lot of attention from policy makers as well as academicians. It is playing an important role in delivering financial services to the “socially and economically excluded” poor, in general, and women, in particular. The group lending works with various dynamic incentives. One such kind is principle of progressive lending and it plays a vital role in sustaining the groups for the persistent delivery of microfinance services to its members. In progressive lending, a typical borrower receives very small amounts at first, which increases with good repayment conduct or it links new, larger loans to past repayment. This article explores possible theoretical and empirical relationship between progressive lending and its determinants in group lending approach. The primary survey was conducted in 10 villages covering 106 self-help groups and 318 members in Karnataka, India. The empirical results show the progressive lending amount rising up to 698% of the initial loan of the self-help groups.

【 授权许可】

CC BY