Military purges and the recurrence of civil conflict:

Research & Politics

Jessica Maves Braithwaite¹ 

关键词: civil conflict;    coup d’etat;    purge;    dictatorship;   

DOI  :  10.1177/2053168016630730

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: Sage Journals

【 摘 要 】

Literature on coup-proofing often suggests that such activities reduce military effectiveness, which could provide an environment ripe for civil conflict. However, if coup-proofing is dangerous, why do leaders engage in these strategies? We argue that a specific type of coup-proofing, military purges, deters domestic unrest by demonstrating the strength of the regime via the removal of powerful but undesirable individuals from office. We use original data on military purges in non-democracies from 1969–2003 to assess quantitatively how this type of coup-proofing activity affects the likelihood of civil conflict recurrence. We find support for our expectation that purges of high-ranking military officials do in fact help prevent further civil conflict. Purges appear to provide real benefits to dictators seeking to preserve stability, at least in post-conflict environments.

【 授权许可】

CC BY-NC-ND