‘Seeing the Dark’: Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference

Frontiers in Psychology

Jakub Limanowski¹ 

关键词: active inference;    attention;    mental action;    opacity;    transparency;    self-model;   

DOI  :  10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00643

学科分类：心理学（综合）

来源: Frontiers

【 摘 要 】

One of the central claims of the Self-model Theory of Subjectivity is that the experience of being someone – even in a minimal form – arises through a transparent phenomenal self-model, which itself can in principle be reduced to brain processes. Here, we consider whether it is possible to distinguish between phenomenally transparent and opaque states in terms of active inference. We propose a relationship of phenomenal opacity to expected uncertainty or precision; i.e., the capacity for introspective attention and implicit mental action. Thus we associate introspective attention with the deployment of ‘precision’ that may render the perceptual evidence (for action) opaque, while treating transparency as a necessary aspect of beliefs about action, i.e., ‘what I am’ doing. We conclude by proposing how we may have to nuance our conception of minimal phenomenal selfhood and agency in light of this active inference conception of transparency-opacity.

【 授权许可】

CC BY