Causal explanations within weak and incomplete theories

Frontiers in Psychology

Nikolai Axmacher¹ 

关键词: psychoanalysis;    neuroscience;    causality;    causal explanations;    neuropsychoanalysis;    epistemology;   

DOI  :  10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01689

学科分类：心理学（综合）

来源: Frontiers

【 摘 要 】

In a previous article (Axmacher, 2013) I argued that neuroscientific and psychoanalytic explanations are in general epistemologically consistent with each other, even if psychoanalytic claims refer to (typically unconscious) reasons, whereas neuroscientific claims are about causes. I claimed that hermeneutic (psychoanalytic) explanations are not inconsistent with causal (neuroscientific) explanations even if they are typically given as “deferred reconstructions”–in other words, as post-hoc explanations of feelings, symptoms or behavioral patterns that initially appear irrational, random and senseless. Specifically, I claimed that psychoanalytic explanations—like (neuro)scientific explanations—are successful if and only if they can determine the sufficient conditions which give rise to the feeling, symptom, or behavioral pattern in question.

【 授权许可】

CC BY