Frontiers in Psychology | |
Two perils of binary categorization: why the study of concepts can't afford true/false testing | |
Greg Jensen1  | |
关键词: concepts; categorization; machine learning; animal cognition; comparative cognition; | |
DOI : 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00168 | |
学科分类:心理学(综合) | |
来源: Frontiers | |
【 摘 要 】
Many claims about concept learning in animals rely on binary categorization tasks (Herrnstein et al., 1976; Freedman et al., 2001; Marsh and MacDonald, 2008). When subjects exceed chance levels of performance, they are alleged to have learned “the concept.” Critics are quick to point out that although subjects have learned something, confounds may explain performance more simply (Katz et al., 2007; Wright and Lickteig, 2010; Zentall et al., 2014). Despite a growing literature on both sides, supporters of “concept learning in animals” seem no closer to persuading the skeptics, while skeptics are no closer to persuading proponents. This rift hinges on disagreements over the strength of the evidence.
【 授权许可】
CC BY
【 预 览 】
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RO201901220569710ZK.pdf | 846KB | download |