期刊论文详细信息
Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine
Engaging the normative question in the H5N1 avian influenza mutation experiments
Norman K Swazo1 
[1] College of Science and General Studies, Alfaisal University, PO Box 50927, Riyadh 11533, Saudi Arabia
关键词: Ethics;    H5N1;    NSABB;    Kawaoka;    Fouchier;    Influenza;   
Others  :  816412
DOI  :  10.1186/1747-5341-8-12
 received in 2012-10-02, accepted in 2013-09-02,  发布年份 2013
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【 摘 要 】

Introduction

In recent time there has been ample discussion concerning censorship of research conducted in two labs involved in avian influenza virus research. Much of the debate has centered on the question whether the methods and results should reach to open disclosure given the “dual use” nature of this research which can be used for nefarious purposes.

Methods

This paper reviews the discussion to date but centers on epistemological issues associated with initial justification of this research and what this entails for continuation of this research despite US governmental biosecurity concerns. The question here is whether there was reasonable moral warrant for genetic alteration of the H5N1 influenza virus.

Conclusion

The paper concludes with philosophical (ethical) justification for continuation of this research.

【 授权许可】

   
2013 Swazo; licensee BioMed Central Ltd.

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