Is acting on delusions autonomous?

Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine

Jann E Schlimme¹ 

[1]Psychiatric University Hospital of Charité at St. Hedwig Hospital, Charité Universitätsmedizin, Große Hamburger Straße 5-11, Berlin 10115, Germany

关键词: Double-orientation to reality;    Goods of agency;    Autonomy;    Self-determination;    Delusional habituality;    Delusional convictions;    Phenomenology;   

Others  :  816405
DOI  :  10.1186/1747-5341-8-14

 received in 2010-07-08, accepted in 2013-09-27,  发布年份 2013

【 摘 要 】

In this paper the question of autonomy in delusional disorders is investigated using a phenomenological approach. I refer to the distinction between freedom of intentional action, and freedom of the will, and develop phenomenological descriptions of lived autonomy, taking into account the distinction between a pre-reflective and a reflective type. Drawing on a case report, I deliver finely-grained phenomenological descriptions of lived autonomy and experienced self-determination when acting on delusions. This analysis seeks to demonstrate that a person with delusions can be described as responsible for her behaviour on a ‘framed’ level (level of freedom of intentional action), even though she is not autonomous on a higher (‘framing’) level (level of freedom of the will), if, and only if, the goods of agency for herself and others are respected. In these cases the person with delusions is very nearly comparable to people in love, who are also not free to choose their convictions, and who could also be rightly held responsible for the behaviour flowing from their convictions.

【 授权许可】

   
2013 Schlimme; licensee BioMed Central Ltd.

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