Funding innovation for treatment for rare diseases: adopting a cost-based yardstick approach

Orphanet Journal of Rare Diseases

Aidan Hollis¹  Garret Kent Fellows¹ 

[1] Department of Economics, The University of Calgary, 2500 University Dr. N.W, Calgary, AB T2N 1 N4, Canada

关键词: Yardsticking;    Rate of return;    Orphan drugs;    Price regulation;   

Others  :  863417
DOI  :  10.1186/1750-1172-8-180

 received in 2013-08-27, accepted in 2013-11-11,  发布年份 2013

【 摘 要 】

Background

Manufacturers justify the high prices for orphan drugs on the basis that the associated R&D costs must be spread over few patients. The proliferation of these drugs in the last three decades, combined with high prices commonly in excess of $100,000 per patient per year are placing a substantial strain on the budgets of drug plans in many countries. Do insurers spend a growing portion of their budgets on small patient populations, or leave vulnerable patients without coverage for valuable treatments? We suggest that a third option is present in the form of a cost-based regulatory mechanism.

Methods

This article explores the use of a cost-based price control mechanism for orphan drugs, adapted from the standard models applied in utilities regulation.

Results and conclusions

A rate-of-return style model, employing yardsticked cost allocations and a modified two-stage rate of return calculation could be effective in setting a new standard for orphan drugs pricing. This type of cost-based pricing would limit the costs faced by insurers while continuing to provide an efficient incentive for new drug development.

【 授权许可】

   
2013 Fellows and Hollis; licensee BioMed Central Ltd.

【 图 表 】

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