The 2011 Famine in Somalia: lessons learnt from a failed response?

Conflict and Health

Rob Bailey¹  Andrew Seal² 

[1] The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James’s Square, London SW1Y 4LE, UK;UCL Institute for Global Health, Institute of Child Health, University College London, 30 Guilford Street, London WC1N 1EH, UK

关键词: War on terror;    Cluster approach;    Political context;    Humanitarian action;    Early warning systems;    Famine;    Somalia;   

Others  :  804464
DOI  :  10.1186/1752-1505-7-22

 received in 2013-04-16, accepted in 2013-08-29,  发布年份 2013

【 摘 要 】

Background

Famine early warning systems clearly identified the risk of famine in South Central Somalia in 2010–2011 but timely action to prevent the onset of famine was not taken. The result was large scale mortality, morbidity, and population displacement.

Discussion

The main factor that turned a drought-related food crisis into a famine was the war that afflicted southern Somalia and the tactics adopted by the various belligerents. These included non-state actors, regional, and international governments. In disasters and complex emergencies, such as this, we posit that five conditions need to be in place to enable humanitarian agencies to provide a timely response to early warnings of famine. These are: presence; access; adequate funding; operational capacity; and legal protection for humanitarian action. In the run up to the Somalia famine each of these presented severe challenges to humanitarian action. The design of the current coordination and funding system contributed to the problems of achieving a neutral, independent, and effective humanitarian response.

Summary

The 2011 famine in Somalia was predicted and could have been mitigated or prevented if the humanitarian response had been timely and more effective. To improve responsiveness to early warnings, action is required to better insulate the humanitarian system from political agendas. While overcoming constraints, such as lack of access, may sometimes be beyond the scope of humanitarian actors, more could be done to enhance the perceived neutrality of parts of the humanitarian system. This should include a reappraisal of the cluster coordination system and reforms to donor funding mechanisms.

【 授权许可】

   
2013 Seal and Bailey; licensee BioMed Central Ltd.

【 参考文献 】

• [1]FSNAU, FEWS NET: Press Release. Expanding Famine Across Southern Somalia. Nairobi: Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit and the Famine Early Warning Systems Network; 2011.
• [2]Zarocostas J: UN intensifies relief efforts as Somali famine is predicted to spread. Br Med J 2011, 343:d4949.
• [3]Checchi F, Robinson W: Mortality among populations of southern and central Somalia affected by severe food insecurity and famine during 2010–2012. Somalia: Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit; 2013. FAO/FSNAU, FEWS-NET
• [4]Maxwell D, Fitzpatrick M: The 2011 Somalia famine: Context, causes, and complications. Global Food Security 2012, 1:5-12.
• [5]Darcy J, Bonard P, Shukria D: IASC real-time evaluation of the humanitarian response to the horn of africa drought crisis Somalia 2011–2012. 2012. http://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/iasc-real-time-evaluation-humanitarian-response-horn-africa-drought-crisis-somalia-0 webcite
• [6]Hillbruner C, Moloney G: When early warning is not enough: Lessons learned from the 2011 Somalia Famine. Global Food Security 2012, 1:20-28.
• [7]Ververs MT: The East African Food Crisis: Did Regional Early Warning Systems Function? J Nutr 2012, 142:131-133.
• [8]Haan N, Devereux S, Maxwell D: Global implications of Somalia 2011 for famine prevention, mitigation and response. Global Food Security 2012, 1:74-79.
• [9]IASC: Guidance Note on Using the Cluster Approach to Strengthen Humanitarian Response. 2006. http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/downloaddoc.aspx?docID=3573&type=pdf webcite
• [10]Nicholson N, Longley K, Fisher M, Walters T: Somalia: An Evaluation of WFP’s Portfolio, Vol. I - Full Report. Rome; 2012.
• [11]Gettleman J: U.S. Delays Somalia Aid, Fearing It Is Feeding Terrorists. New York Times; 2009.
• [12]Hammond L, Vaughan-Lee H: Humanitarian Space in Somalia: A Scarce Commodity. London; 2012.
• [13]IRIN: Somalia: Al-Shabab ban on agencies threatens aid. Integrated Regional Information Networks. 3-8-2012 2011. http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94321/SOMALIA-Al-Shabab-ban-on-agencies-threatens-aid webcite
• [14]Pantuliano S, Mackintosh K, Elhawary S: Counter-terrorism and humanitarian action. Tensions, impacts and ways forward. London; 2011.
• [15]Pflanz M: EU guilty of “wilful neglect” as UN says 10,000s have died in Somalia’s famine. The Telegraph 2012. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/somalia/8649246/EU-guilty-of-wilful-neglect-as-UN-says-10000s-have-died-in-Somalias-famine.html webcite
• [16]Menkhaus K: Stabilisation and humanitarian access in a collapsed state: the Somali case. Disasters 2010, 34:S320-S341.
• [17]Government of Kenya: The Republic of Kenya: Infrastruture. 2012. http://republicofkenya.org/economy/infrastructure/ webcite
• [18]Gettleman J: Kenyan Motives in Somalia Predate Recent Abductions. New York Times; 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/27/world/africa/kenya-planned-somalia-incursion-far-in-advance.html webcite
• [19]Rémy J: Kenya develops plan for satellite region of Jubaland on Somali border. The Guardian 2012.
• [20]Bailey R: Famine Early Warning and Early Action: the Cost of Delay. London; 2012.
• [21]Macrae J, Zwi A, Duffield M, Slim H: War and Hunger, Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies. London and New Jersey: Zed Books and Save the Children (UK); 1994.
• [22]Goverment of the Republic of Somaliland: Our Country: Peaceful and Prosperous. 2013. http://somalilandgov.com/country-profile/ webcite
• [23]Goverment of Somalia: The Regions. 2013. http://www.somaligov.net/The%20Regions.html webcite
• [24]BBC: Somalia Profile: Timeline. 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094632 webcite
• [25]Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea: Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2002 (2011). 2012.
• [26]Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, S/2013/69. United Nations; 2013.
• [27]Associated Press: Somali government accuses Kenya troops in Kismayo of backing 1 militia over others in fighting. The Washington Post; 2013.
• [28]Abdi R: Somalia: Lights and shadows. Nairobi: Daily Nation; 2013.
• [29]IASC: Operational Guidance on the Concept of the ‘Provider of Last Resort’. 2012.
• [30]The Sphere Handbook 2011: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response. 2011.
• [31]Good Humanitarian Donorship: 23 Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship. 2012. [Good Humanitarian Donorship]