Analysis of production-inventory decisions in a decentralized supply chain with price-dependent demand

The Indonesian Operations Research Association (IORA) - International Conference on Operations Research 2016

Kurdhi, N.A.^1 ; Irsanianto, S.T.^1 ; Sutanto^1

Department of Mathematics, Sebelas Maret University, Indonesia^1

关键词: Administrative cost;    Decentralized supply chains;    Price dependent demand;    Production inventories;    Real situation;    Stackelberg;    Stackelberg Games;    Supply chain systems;   

Others  :  https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1757-899X/166/1/012014/pdf
DOI  :  10.1088/1757-899X/166/1/012014

来源: IOP

【 摘 要 】

In this paper, we consider a production-inventory supply chain system with single-manufacturer and single-retailer. There are many types of contract that guarantee the supply chain. However, the administrative costs of the contract are usually neglected in real situation. The additional gain from integration may not cover the extra administrative costs may not addressed to supply chain. Therefore, a Stackelberg game and RFM policy are examined in order to investigate its performance on supply chain. The RFM policy is applied because its administrative costs are lower than othe policies. Although RFM policy is not capable of coordinating the channel, it leads to considerable improvements over the channel. The purpose of this research is to present a model of integrated policy, in which the goal is to maximize the whole system profit, and to evaluate decentralized-Stackelberg and RFM policies, in which individual firms in the supply chain have their own objectives and decisions to optimize.