The Promotion Effect of Executive Compensation Stickiness on Corporate R&D Investment: Empirical Evidence Based on PSM

4th International Conference on Energy Equipment Science and Engineering

Xiaoman, Wu^1 ; Jun, Liu^1 ; Tongying, Liang^2 ; Li, Pan^3

School of Business and Law, Foshan University, Foshan

528000, China^1

School of Business Administration, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou

510641, China^2

BeiJing Waterworks Group, China^3

关键词: Executive compensation;    Failure tolerance;    Incentive mechanism;    Promotion effects;    Propensity score matching;    Research results;    Sample selection bias;    State owned enterprise;   

Others  :  https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1755-1315/242/5/052054/pdf
DOI  :  10.1088/1755-1315/242/5/052054

来源: IOP

【 摘 要 】

The impact of executive compensation stickiness on corporate R&D investment behavior is a new issue in the financial and financial field. A small amount of literature has analyzed the above issues, but they have ignored the possible adverse effects of sample selection bias on the research results. This paper takes the 2008-2016 China Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as the research samples, uses propensity score matching (PSM) to empirically test whether the executive pay viscous significantly promotes R&D investment. The study found: under the premise of controlling sample selection bias, the R&D investment level of the executives with sticky and high-viscosity group is significantly higher than that of the sample companies with no sticky and low-viscosity groups. As a kind of salary incentive mechanism with failure tolerance characteristics, executive pay sticky has a significant promotion effect on Chinese R&D investment. Further research has also found that, especially for non-state-owned enterprises and high-tech enterprises, executive compensation stickiness has a stronger effect on corporate R&D investment.