Game Analysis of Project General Contracting Rent-seeking

International Conference on Manufacturing Technology, Materials and Chemical Engineering

材料科学;化学工业

Cheng, Lian-Hua^1 ; Wang, Zi-Yue^1 ; Zhang, Yan-Hua^1

College of Safety Science and Engineering, Xi'An University of Science and Technology, Xi'an

710054, China^1

关键词: Formation mechanism;    Game analysis;    Game models;    Game players;    General contractors;    Optimal decision making;    Rent-seeking;   

Others  :  https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1757-899X/592/1/012122/pdf
DOI  :  10.1088/1757-899X/592/1/012122

学科分类：材料科学（综合）

来源: IOP

【 摘 要 】

It is important to clearly understand the rent-seeking behavior of all parties involved in the general contracting mode. First, the formation mechanism of rent-seeking was analyzed. Then, the game model of the owners, general contractors, supervision units, government and society during the operation of the general contracting project was proposed, to explore the decision-making space and behavior mechanism of relevant stakeholders. Finally, the optimal decision-making of the game players under different situations was discussed. The results show that the general contractor and supervision rent-seeking probability is affected by the owner's supervision cost and supervision probability; the probability of owner supervision is related to the ability of owner and government public to supervise and punish rent-seeking behavior; and the ability of government and public to supervise is related to the cost of supervision and the reward value of supervision success.