会议论文详细信息
12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Maximizing Matching in Doublesided Auctions (Extended Abstract)
Jinzhong Niu ; Simon Parsons
PID  :  123887
来源: CEUR
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【 摘 要 】
Traditionally in double auctions, offers are cleared at the equilib rium price. In this paper, we introduce a novel, nonrecursive, matching algorithm for double auctions, which aims to maximize the amount of commodities to be traded. Our algorithm has lower
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