Creating incentives to prevent execution failures: an extension of VCG mechanisms

Scheduling in Computer and Manufacturing Systems

计算机科学;物理学

Yingqian Zhang ; Mathijs de Weerdt

PID  :  78570

学科分类：计算机科学（综合）

来源: CEUR

【 摘 要 】

When information or control in a multiagent system is private to theagents, they may misreport this information or refuse to execute an agreed out come, in order to change the resulting end state of such a system to their benefit. In some domains this may result in an execution failure. We show that in such settings VCG mechanisms lose truthfulness, and that the utility of truthful agents can become negative when using VCG payments (i.e., VCG is not strongly indi vidually rational). To deal with this problem, we introduce an extended payment structure which takes into account the actual execution of the promised outcome. We show that this extended mechanism can guarantee a nonnegative utility and is (i) incentive compatible in a Nash equilibrium, and (ii) incentive compatible in