The Logic of Bargaining

Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents

计算机科学;物理学

Dongmo Zhang

PID  :  81794

学科分类：计算机科学（综合）

来源: CEUR

【 摘 要 】

This paper reexamines the gametheoretic bargaining theory from logicand Artificial Intelligence perspectives. We present an axiomatic characteriza tion of the logical solutions to bargaining problems. A bargaining situation is de scribed in propositional logic with numerical representation of bargainers’ pref erences. A solution to the nperson bargaining problems is proposed based on the maxmin rule over the degrees of bargainers’ satisfaction. The solution is uniquely characterized by four axioms collective rationality, scale invariance, symmetry and mutually comparable monotonicity in conjunction with three other funda mental assumptions individual rationality, consistency and comprehensiveness. The Pareto efficient solutions are characterized by the axioms scale invariance, Pareto optimality and restricted mutually comparable monotonicity along with the basic assumptions. The relationships of these axioms and assumptions and their links to belief revision postulates and game theory axioms are discussed. The framework would help us to identify the logical reasoning behind bargaining processes and would initiate a new methodology of bargaining analysis.